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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEO M. BERTAGNOLE, INC.,
a corporation, BERTAGNOLE
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP (Substituted) ,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
PINE MEADOW RANCHES,
a corporation, et al,
DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16900

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
As in the previous brief, appellants will be referred
to as plaintiffs and respondents will be referred to as
defendants.

ARGUMENT
I

THE LIS PENDENS WAS SUFFICIENT
UNDER STATE LAW
With respect to defendant's statement of facts,
reference is made to Section 78-40-2, UCA 1953, relating to
Lis Pendens.

The cited statute provides a means of giving

constructive notice of the pendency of an action which in
effect is a republication of the pleadings in the underlying
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action.

See Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P2d 186.
In the instant case, appellants recorded a Lis

Pend~

describing the property to which plaintiffs claimed ownership
and to which plaintiff owned legal title on August 19, 1974.
(R 221, 222)

The Lis Pendens stated the court and cause,

described the property in question and certainly would have led
anyone who wanted more information to the case file.

Neither

defendants nor anyone else was claiming any right or interest
in the subject property in Section 35, Township 1 North, Range

4 East, by written or recorded document.
At the time the lawsuit was filed, plaintiff served
all those of which plaintiff was aware who might be using the
road in question, making them parties of the action, and in
addition served unknown defendants by publication.

It should

be noted that the actual parties to the lawsuit received SUIIllllonses
and complaints, which is actual notice and more encompassing than
any notice in a Lis Pendens.
Defendants' argument that the Lis Pendens should have
been more specific and included lands miles away from the subject property would have the effect of requiring plaintiffs
to anticipate and speculate as to every possible user of the
land and place no burden on one claiming some possessory
interest in property to which he has no legal title to ascertain his legal rights.

Certainly if one intends to exercise

some possessory right over property, such as using it as an
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access road, he should have some obligation to investigate
his title or claim of right to that property over which he is
claiming a possessory interest.
It is well established that in a quiet title action
plaintiff can prevail by showing his own record title.

In

such case, constructive possession is presumed in absence of
evidence to the contrary.
Gibson v. McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 106 P 669.
Any person interested in property above plaintiff
could have checked the County records to see who owned property over which access is dependant.

Such an investigation

would have disclosed the Lis Pendens and led to the pleadings
of the instant case.

II
THE EVIDENCE AND LAW DO NOT
SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
In defendant's brief, at page 16, defendant asserts
that plaintiff "has refrained from citing any of the mountain
road cases such as Lindsay Land & Livestock v. Churnos,
Sullivan v. Condas, Jeremy v. Bertagnole, and Boyer v. Clark."
Defendants' brief further states, "It is apparent
that more stringent evidentiary tests have been applied by
the Supreme Court in the valley, short distance road cases,
such as Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P2d 646 (dead
-3-
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end street called McClelland Street in Salt Lake City) and
Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P 2d 5lf.5."
The above-cited cases represent all of the cases
cited by defendant in his brief.
The following is a discussion of each of the cases
referred to by defendants with an explanation below each
case as to why it is not in point in the instant case:
1.

Lindsay Land and Livestock v. Churnos, 75 Utah

285 p 646:
The trial court found that in 1876 a described roadway was laid out over the land in question when it was part of
the public domain.

The evidence is further sUmm.arized as

follows:
A.

At the end of the road were public and private

lands suitable for grazing and was used extensively for grazing.
B.

In 1876, a sawmill was constructed and the road

used by people generally to haul logs to the sawmill and lumber
from the sawmill.
C.

Other sawmills were set up along this road before

D.

In 1885 mining was developed and houses were

1890.

built, a post office established and hundreds of people resided
in the mining camp for more than five years.
E.

The road was traveled extensively by the general

public in going to and from the mining camp.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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F.

During all periods the road was used by numerous

owners of sheep, "a hundred herds", as many as seven herds a
day going over the road.
In the instant case the road in question dated back
to 1915 and was then used for hauling supplies to sheepherders
on private land.

There was also some evidence which was not

tied to specific periods when deer hunters and fishermen were
seen and when picnics were held, but this evidence was at best
very sketchy.

There was no evidence of any general use by the

public until about 1972 when subdivision lots were sold just
two years before this lawsuit was commenced.
In holding that a public road had been established
in Lindsay Land and Livestock v. Churnos, the following was
stated:
"We think the evidence established a general
public use of the road. If the claim rested alone
upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or
for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep,
the question would be more difficult. But here
the road connected two points between which there
was occasion for considerable public travel. The
road was a public convenience. When sawmills were
established on or near the road, it was used, not
only by those conducting the sawmills, but by many
others who went to the sawmills to get lumber, etc.
During the period when the mining camp existed in
the vicinity, ~he road was unquestionably used
very extensively by the general public for general
purposes. And all the time it was used as a general
way for the driving or trailing of sheep. This
latter use was not by a few persons, but by many
persons, and it involved more than the mere driving
of animals on the road. Camp outfits and supplies
accompanied the herds and were moved over the road
in camp wagons and on pack horses. While it is
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difficult to fix a standard by which to measure
what is a public use or a public thoroughfare, it
can be said here that the road was used by many
and different persons for a variety of purposes;
that it was open to all who desired to use it;
that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the situation and surroundings would
permit, had the road been formally laid out as a
public highway by public authority.
The facts of the above-cited case with its road
established before patent and very extensive use for a number
of purposes is not a precedent for and is very different from
the use which has been proven in the instant case.
2.

Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 583, 290 P 954:

It is again important to look at the facts set forth
in the case.

The road in question existed as -early as 1873

while the land on which it was established was part of the public
domain and before the patent was issued.

Specific evidence of

use is not discussed in the case except to say that the road was
used generally by the public as occasion required in going up
and down the canyon.

The court stated that because the public

uses were established over public lands

before the patent was

issued, the patent was taken subject to that public right.
No evidence has been presented in the instant case
as to existence of a road or use before the patent was issued.
Because the facts of Sullivan v. Condas do not describe actual
use to establish the public right, it cannot be compared to
the instant case in determining a standard of necessary use.
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3.

Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P 2d 420:

The facts again indicate that the public use was
established before patent to the ground in question was issued.
It should further be noted that the road in question connected
State Highway U.S. 30-S with U.S. 40-530 and had been continuously used for 60 years by ranchmen, stockmen, owners of land
contiguous and adjacent thereto and by the public generally for
all necessary and convenient purposes.

In addition, both

Morgan and Sunnnit Counties intervened to have the road declared
publi'c.

The Court held the road to be public based upon exten-

sive use.
The instant case is very different in that no use
was established before patent.

The road does not connect two

state. roads and the extensive public use is not present.

Summit

County has not intervened in the present case.
4.

B·oyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 39 5, 326 P 2d 107:

Th.ts case was cited by plaintiff at page 13 of the
plaintiffs•, brief.
Again, this case concerned a road for which use was
estaoli~hed

as public before the patent was issued.

The road

in question was used to haul coal, drive sheep and cattle, ride
horses or

w~gons,

deer hunting, visiting people in the vicinity,

going to .. dances held in Grass Creek, as well as trailing sheep
or cattle.

This road rand from State Highway No. 133 to Grass

Creek, thus connecting a residential area with a state highway.

-7-
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The facts again are different from the instant case
in that there are not two points of public area to be connected
as in Boyer v. Clark.

Instead the road in question goes to

private land used in the past for livestock grazing.

The

present subdivision and residential uses were not in existence
during any ten year period prior to filing the lawsuit, and
there is not the evidence of the consistent regular public uses
as in Boyer v. Clark.
Taking all of the above cases together, they all concern roads'established prior to patent, they all had roads used
for purposes for which there was a public need, such as grazing
on public lands, serving residential establishments and connecting!
state highways or communities.
in the instant case.
private land.

None of these

public needs exist

The land above the road in question is

Except for sheep men who may have acquired some

prescriptive right, the uses of the road were by guests, trespassers or owners of land using the road without permission.
Defendants are seeking to have the road declared a public road
to serve defendants' subdivision which came into existence only
two years before the lawsuit was filed.

Even this use does not

serve the public as all land is privately owned.
With respect to the other cases defendants cited,
Bonner v. Sudbury relates to a dead end alley located in Salt
Lake City which was platted in 1915 as a city street; it was
paved by the city; street signs were maintained by the city;
-8-
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the owner had not paid taxes for 25 years on the ground, and it
was used by the general public for a variety

of activities.

These facts are clearly far removed from the instant case.
The last case cited by defendant, Peterson v. Combe,
20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P2d 545, is a case which related to a
road originally built by the owner to serve his own property
and dead ending at his property boundary.

A subdivider

acquired the property adjoining the dead end and proceeded to
build houses served by the road.

The trial court found a public

road, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed holding that the road
was not a public road and stated the principal in these types of
cases that there must be competent evidence of witnesses who are
not self-serving to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the public generally, not just a few having their own special and
private interest in the road, had used it continuously for ten
years.

The court further stated that the road would have to be

condemned for a public use.

The time frame involving the sub-

division in the instant case and in Peterson v. Combe is similar
and the principles of that case are applicable to the present
case.

-

The witnesses called by defendants were •ei!=h;er . present

owners of all or some of the property above the property in
question or predecessors in interest and are therefore selfserving witnesses as described in Peterson v. Combe, having a
direct interest in the outcome.

This is not the clear and con-

vincing evidence mentioned in Peterson v. Combe.
-9-
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CONCLUSION
The cases cited in the defendants' brief are not in
point for the reasons stated above.

There is no evidence that

a highway 30 feet wide had been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a ten year period prior to the filing of this
suit in 1974.

No evidence has been presented that a road was

in existence before a patent was issued.

There is no evidence

in this case of a public need for a public road.

All of the

land served by the road in question is and during all uses in
evidence was private land.

Deer hunters, fishermen, picnickers

were all trespassing, not only on the road, but in most cases on
the land where they were carrying out their activities.

Private

land owners and their guests may or may not have some private
prescriptive right, but they have an obligation to inquire into
and assure their access rights.

There is no -public interest

served by providing an access road to a private subdivision as
i$ the case here and in Peterson v. Combe.

For the reasons

stated, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and
the title to the road in question quieted in plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN AND SKEEN

By:

R. C. SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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